the Commerce Control List (CCL) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) administered by the Departments of Commerce and State, respectively. The MCTL is also used as a reference tool for evaluating potential technology transfers and for determining whether technical reports and scientific papers are eligible for public release. (For a more detailed history of export controls and the MCTL, see the accompanying sidebar History of Export Control Regulations.) The current, public edition of the MCTL is on the Internet (http://www. dtic.mil/mctl) and is continually updated as progress is made on the technologies described in the basic document. For government and contractor personnel with access to the Defense Technical Information Center's STINET, a more complete version of the MCTL is available.
The MCTL provides a codification of what DOD believes to be critical to the military superiority of the U.S. In combination with sound technical judgment, the list may be used to assess whether a proposed transaction permits a technology transfer allowing potential adversaries access to technologies whose specific performance levels are at or above the characteristics identified as militarily critical. The list provides guidance, but is not an export control list in-and-of-itself. The MCTL should be used for initial guidance on the dissemination of critical technologies, and can provide input to export control policy.
Critical Technologies in Action
Within the Defense community, there are various mechanisms set up to control proliferation of critical technologies. The most obvious are the procedures for dealing with classified materials, but less obvious are those intended to protect what are called critical technologies.
The first and last line of defense for protection of critical technologies is the researcher. Initial decisions about what to publish, what talks to give, and who to talk to, represent the first step in protecting data. The next step is divisional management and/or the Public Affairs Office of specific bases or labs (for government personnel). Contractor personnel follow their own company-specific internal procedures. The decision on whether to allow something to be published or presented in a public forum is ultimately left up to an individual that has the administrative authority to control release of technology. They will often utilize the assistance of senior technical staff in making complex decisions. For researchers at accredited institutions of higher learning performing fundamental research, there is a blanket exemption from the requirements of export control. According to the amended Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 22, Parts 123 and 125, these institutions do not have to register the export of data or equipment produced solely for, or from, fundamental research. This policy has shifted back and forth from full and open disclosure to restricted release over the past 40 years, and currently there is congressional pressure to limit the exemption as it is currently written. The main exception to the exemption is when an academic researcher initially agrees to information restrictions as a condition of doing the research.
Beyond individual researchers and their departments, DOD has various mechanisms for controlling release of information including service-level offices and specific, joint-service offices set up for selected technology areas. These coordinating offices tend to focus on particularly sensitive technology areas such as low observables (signature reducing technologies) or directed energy (lasers, etc.). If a technology is controlled, there are criminal and civil penalties for their unauthorized dissemination, thus making the offender personally liable for the act. Additionally, companies who develop technologies (whe ther with government funding or not) are responsible for their control and can also be held criminally and civilly liable for unauthorized technology transfers.
I n a p p ro p ri a te tra n s fer of te chnology is not limited to papers , j o u rnal articles, pre p a red ta l ks and lectures, but can also include p a tents and sales of te ch n o l o g y. In the case of defe n s e -re l a te d p a tents, the Pa tent and Tra d e m a rk Office (PTO) rev i ews each application for innova t i ve meri t; then it is assessed by va ri o u s recognized ex p e rts within DOD. These ex p e rts will make re commendations about whether the te chnology is critical. If it is, then a patent may not be gra n ted, thus keeping the te ch n o l o g y out of the public re c o rd. When a U.S. comp a ny wishes to sell i d e n t i fied critical te chnology to another U.S. comp a ny, multinational comp a ny, or fo reign comp a ny, the sale must be rev i ewed by DOD. The laws va ry, depending on the specifics of e a ch case, but basically the U.S. gove rnment has the right to stop a pending sale. Congressional action would be re qu i red to ove rride this decision.
The Departments of State and Commerce also maintain lists of countries that are automatically considered off limits for release of critical technologies. There are six countries on this list, including Iraq, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Libya and the Sudan. While export of critical technologies may be allowed to most other countries, export to the nations on this list is out of the question.
The penalty for unlawful export of items or information controlled under the ITAR is up to 10 years imprisonment, a fine of $1,000,000, or both (22 U.S.C. 2778). Companies found to export information controlled under the Export Administration Regulations (commonly called the CCL referred to above,) can also be fined up to $1,000,000, or five times the value of the export, whichever is greater. An individual named in such an action can be imprisoned for up to 10 years, fined up to $250,000, or both. (50 U.S.C. 2410). Companies cited for export control violations are typically barred from obtaining export licenses for at least three years, and can potentially be barred from doing any business with the government. The MCTL was developed as a th re e -p a rt document, Weapons Systems Technologies (WST), Weapons of Mass D e st ruction (WMD) and Developing Critical Te ch n o l o g i e s (DCT). Each section addresses a major area of technology vital to the security and warfighting capability of the United States (see Table 1 ). Areas of greatest concern to the AMPTIAC community like high performance materials, advanced materials processing methods and improved manufacturing techniques are covered in both the WST and the DCT (see Table 2 ). Please note that Tables  1 and 2 address the broad materials classes that contain some critical technologies. Whether or not a material is deemed critical is entirely dependent upon its performance characteristics. For example Table 2 denotes tungsten as being addressed in the MCTL. However, this material is only deemed critical when it is processed in such a way that it has an elongation greater than 3%, a yield strength greater than 1250 MPa, an ultimate tensile strength greater than 1270 MPa, and a density greater than 17.5 g/cm 3 . The reader is referred to the MCTL itself to determine the critical performance indicators for other materials of interest.
It should be emphasized that the MCTL is not a control list; it is a list of technologies that are of particular military importance. However, for a number of reasons (e.g., worldwide availability, controllability, etc.), some critical technologies listed on the MCTL are not subject to export controls. For the convenience of the reader, the MCTL lists the control status of the MCTL entries.
As DOD researchers or engineers working with new materials, processing methods, and manufacturing techniques, it is our responsibility to use sound judgment and protect the safety of our uniformed services on the field of battle. The case studies following on the next page will more fully illustrate some of the considerations involved when dealing with critical or potentially critical technologies.
For more information about the Militarily Critical Technologies Program, please consult the MCTL website … www.dtic.mil/mctl or make inquiries via email at mctl-admin@ida.org.
AMPTIAC A D VA N C E D M A T E R I A L S A N D P R O C E S S E S T E C H N O L O G Y
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Case 1 A researcher at an Army lab working with titanium diboride (TiB 2 ), develops an armor s a n d w i ch st ru c t u re of th ree Ti B 2 p l a te s between a front and back plate of woven carbon fiber cloth impregnated with epoxy resin. The TiB 2 plates are 99% dense. This structure is then mounted to a Nomex honeycomb backing surface and tested in a standard impact regimen with a fragmentsimulating projectile at various velocities. The material preparation and specifics on thickness of each plate in the system, as well as test results are detailed in a paper to be presented at an unclassified conference.
Ac c o rding to the MCTL, (Weapons Syste m s Te chnologies {WST}, Section 11.1, Arm o r and Anti-armor Mate rials) ceramics with gre a ter than 98% th e o retical density, in laye red st ru c t u res specifi c a l ly intended fo r a b s o rption of kinetic energ y, are milita ri ly c ritical. Ti tanium diboride is specifi c a l ly cite d as a mate rial of special inte re st, as well as the arra n gement of laye red st ru c t u res as d e s c ribed above. This paper describes a te chnology which, though perhaps not class i fied, defi n i te ly falls into the cate g o ry of mili ta ri ly critical, and is pote n t i a l ly subject to ex p o rt control. Dissemination of this info rm ation without proper clearance could ve ry well be illegal. Check the MCTL column " C o n t rol Regimes" to dete rmine whether th e p a rticular mate rial is contro l l e d .
Case 2 A scientist at an Air Force lab develops a composite superconductor with a cross sectional area of approximately 35 square micrometers. Its critical temperature (T c ), below which the material functions as a superconductor, is 30K with no imposed magnetic field, but will remain superconducting with an imposed magnetic field of up to 1 Tesla. The composite is fabricated in lengths up to 40 meters. The scientist wants to publish the results in a technical journal.
This example does not fall within the specific parameters outlined in the MCTL (WST, Section 11.2, Electrical Mate ri a l s ) . H oweve r, sound engineering judgment should be used to ascertain the implications that this innovation has on the science. For instance, does divulging this information enable adversaries to leap ahead of current capabilities? Or does specific information in the intended publication enable further innovation that would place U.S. superiority at risk? , 2002) allows a significant level of academic freedom, but there is congressional pressure to limit it. The MCTL specifically calls out performance of signature reducing materials and systems, as well as the associated test procedures, simulation software, and test hardware (WST, Section 16, Signature Contro l Technologies). The parameters of signal attenuation outlined above fall above the "tripwire" values set forth in this section, thus for non-academic re s e a rch e rs this wo rk would re qu i re evaluation by the DOD before it could be disseminated or exported. Academic researchers should address this to their sponsor or other appropriate officials. Low-observable and counter-lowobservable (LO/CLO) technologies have their own offices within each service that a re responsible for rev i ew of pote n t i a l export issues in this field. Contact information and procedures on this topic can be found in the MCTL, Section 16.
Case 4 A defense contra c tor develops a lightweight, 125-cm mir ror, which has potential

M a t e r i a l E A S E
HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDIES:
The following hypothetical examples are meant to provide the reader with realworld examples of critical technology questions and issues. These should only be used as guidance in the consideration of critical technology issues and in no way supersede the guidance provided by the MCTL, or the departments of Defense, Commerce or State. In cases where the control status of a technology is not clear, control information can be obtained from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (formerly the Bureau of Export Administration), by requesting a Commodity Classification. (www.bxa.doc.gov or (202) 482-4811)
History of Export Control Regulations
The concepts of export control and militarily critical technologies have been part of America for most of its history. In 1774, the First Continental Congress declared illegal the importation of British goods as well as the export of goods to Britain. Since that time, the United States has imposed export controls for a variety of reasons through numerous executive and legislative actions. Several laws still in effect today (with modifications) were enacted soon after World War II. For example, the Export Control Act of 1949 gave the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) the responsibility of administering and enforcing export controls on dual-use items and, for the first time, defined three reasons for the imposition of these controls: national security, foreign policy, and short supply.
The DOC's Bureau of Indust ry and Security (fo rm e rly the Bureau of Export Ad m i n i st ration or BXA) is responsible for issuing Export Ad m i n i st ration Regulations (EARs), which define the te chnical para m ete rs for issuing ex p o rt licenses. This listing is re fe rred to as the Commerce Contro l L i st (CCL) and some may find its length and ex te n s i ve use of te chnical te rms intimidating. The d etailed listing of te chnical para m ete rs in the CCL establishes precise, objective cri te ria th a t should (in most cases) enable one to ascertain the appro p ri a te control status. Bro a d e r, more s u b j e c t i ve cri te ria would cause ex p o rte rs and re -ex p o rte rs to be more dependent upon DOC i n te rp retations and rulings. More ove r, much of the CCL's detail is deri ved from multilate ra l ly a d o p ted lists. This specificity serves to enhance the unifo rmity and effe c t i veness of inte rn a t i o n a l c o n t rol practices and to pro m ote a "level playing fi e l d ." The detailed pre s e n tation of elements (e.g., licensing and ex p o rt clearance pro c e d u res) enables the ex p o rter to find in one place what he/she must know to comp ly with pertinent re qu i rements. Of special imp o rtance is the deta i l e d l i sting of License Exception cri te ria, which enable the ex p o rter to dete rmine qu i ck ly, and with c o n fidence, whether he/she needs to obtain an ex p o rt license. Fi n a l ly, some of the EAR's deta i l is specifi c a l ly aimed at avoiding loopholes and permitting effe c t i ve enfo rc e m e n t .
Almost 20 The basic purpose of the MCTL is to define technologies that are critical for continued U.S. military superiority. The list is used primarily to provide technical justification and rationale for new proposals and to ensure the continuation of specific technology controls enforced under U.S. regulations and other multinational agreements. It is also used as a reference tool for evaluating potential technology transfers and for determining whether technical reports and scientific papers are eligible for public release.
The fi rst ve rsion of the MCTL was published in 19 81. Since then the list has been u p d a ted seven times and is curre n t ly published as an unclassified document (alth o u g h some parts are limited dist ribution). The current edition of the MCTL is on the Inte rn et (http://www.dtic.mil/mctl) and is continually being updated as progress is made on the technologies described in the basic document. Moreover, the Internet has provided the opportunity for more people to comment on proposed changes.
application to an orbital surveillance satellite. A British company expresses interest in adapting the mirror for use in an orbiting astronomical obser vatory to be launched by France's Arianne.
The parameters as described are somewhat tricky to evaluate. If a radiation reflectance level were quoted, it could be evaluated against the values in the MCTL, but the size of the mirror and the statement that it is "lightweight" also require attention. The MCTL calls out (in WST, Section 17.2, Optronics) that low area density space optics with apertures greater than 1 meter are critical. This technology should be treated as if it were a critical technology until a review by DOD has been p e rfo rmed. For any te chnology that is deemed critical and regulated by the CCL, ITAR, or other specific control regime, the company developing the mirror is responsible for controlling the technology, even if there were no government funds used in its development. In cases of unclear or developing technologies, a determination of commodity jurisdiction may be desirable. Information on this procedure may be obtained through the Department of State. While the list of MCT does not specifically name CAD-based simulation software packages, it does address rapid prototyping sof tware. For this case, where the software would be used to significantly reduce manufacturing development ef forts, lower costs of manufacturing through reduced waste and rejects, and speed development of novel parts, it could definitely be judged militarily critical. This technology should be evaluated before it is exported.
Case 5
